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Abstract What should we do if climate change or global
injustice require radical policy changes not supported by
the majority of citizens? And what if science shows that
the lacking support is largely due to shortcomings in
citizens’ individual psychology such as cognitive biases
that lead to temporal and geographical parochialism?
Could then a plausible case for enhancing the morality
of the electorate—even against their will –be made? But
can a democratic government manipulate the will of the
people without losing democratic legitimacy? This paper
explores the problems that governmental manipulation of
voters pose for democratic legitimacy and the tensions
between non-manipulated input and morally acceptable
output. These venerable issues of political theory resur-
face in light of recent suggestions to tackle today’s global
mega-problems by Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu.
They suggest that to avert the looming catastrophe, gov-
ernments should alter psychological traits of the citizenry
through biomedical means, from pharmaceuticals to ge-
netics. However, we argue that a government cannot rule
with democratic legitimacy if elected by a will of the
people it manipulated before. Normatively, conferring
power from the governed onto governors is a one-
directional relation that is incompatible with manipulation.
But while it is tempting to rebut suggestions to morally
enhance the people as antithetical to essential ideas of
democracy, swift rebuttals tend to overlook the deeper
challenge: Majoritarian decision-making may lead to
inacceptable outcomes. The dilemma between input and
output runs through major works in political theory.
Rather than wishfully ignoring the dangers of democracy,
democratic theory has to provide answers.
Keywords Manipulation .Moral enhancement .
Democracy . Indoctrination .Moral psychology
Introduction
Psychology has provided ample evidence that human
decision-making is prone to distorting factors such as
unconscious biases. Some of these cognitive and emo-
tional deficiencies can affect moral and political deci-
sions. For instance, because negative long term effects
of actions (and omissions) are systematically and dis-
proportionately discounted, humans are prone to tem-
poral parochialism. Further, solidarity and altruism are
often only extended to people near to us, to Bin-groups^,
but not to Bout-groups^ who are more likely discrimi-
nated against—geographical parochialism. Ingmar
Persson and Julian Savulescu relate such individual
shortcomings to large scale political problems [1, 2, 3,
also see the other papers in this issue]. They argue that
the structure of global problems bears striking resem-
blance to deficits in individual minds. The devastating
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in decades but have to be averted today. The inaction in
face of a looming catastrophe could be due to the
systematic discounting of long term effects. Likewise,
poverty and starvation in the so called Third World
could be averted or mitigated by modest efforts of the
Western world. Nonetheless, such policies do not find a
majority in western parliaments.
A democratic political order might increase the prob-
lem exponentially: if psychological deficiencies befall a
majority of the electorate, majoritarian rule will likely let
their consequences prevail over more reasonable views.
Assuming that individual psychology indeed explains a
considerable portion of voting behavior and, likewise,
the inability of democracies to tackle pressing political
problems on a global scale, Persson and Savulescu
propose an intriguing solution: Governments should
alter psychological traits of citizens, enhancing the psy-
chological conditio humana, and remedying cognitive
and emotional shortcomings on a society-wide scale
through (not yet available) biomedical or neurophysio-
logical means such as psychotropics, electric or magnet-
ic brain stimulation, and genetics. A different mindset of
the electorate may afford the implementation of urgently
needed drastic yet unpopular policies.
Notably, Persson and Savulescu do not wish to aban-
don democracy in favor of more authoritarian regimes,
even though it seems Beasier for authoritarian political
systems to implement unpopular policies than … for
democracies.^ They only seek to underscore the weak-
nesses of democracies to tackle problems that require
unpopular solutions:
As history has shown with frightful clarity, author-
itarian regimes can go disastrously wrong in ways
that to this day no democracy has done, precisely
because of this capacity to implement unpopular
policies, which often promote only the interests of
the ruling class. In our view, the solution to the
mega-problems of today, if there is one, lies not in
a shift to an authoritarian type government, but in
moral enhancement of the citizens in democracies.
[1, p. 8]
Thus, they propose moral enhancement of the elec-
torate as a democratic solution. This suggestion inspires
our inquiry. We suppose that governmental programs to
significantly alter citizens’moral properties imply a shift
to authoritarianism because the manipulative alteration
of citizens’ voting behavior is antithetical to democracy.
At least, governmental use of moral enhancements to
modulate political decision-making of voters (without
their consent) and, therewith, electoral outcomes poses
intriguing problems for democratic theory. In particular,
the legitimacy of a government is cast in shadows if it is
elected after it manipulatively altered citizens’ opinions
and if the alteration caused the electoral outcome, i.e. if
voters would have voted differently without the alter-
ation. In that case, we suggest that government lacks
legitimacy even though it was elected by a majority and
all further conditions of a fair election were observed.
Persson and Savulescu address the problem of legiti-
macy only in passing, and although we will loosely come
back to their work, we wish to engage with the problem
of severe voter manipulation in more abstract terms. It is
an intriguing issue that cuts to the bone of democratic
theory, but is rarely pursued because discussions are
caught up in empirical and normative controversies about
what constitutesmanipulation (e.g., campaigning, agenda
setting). State-run moral enhancement programs provide
an instructive test case to discuss normative ramifications
of manipulation because, so we suggest, they qualify as
severely manipulative. Persson and Savulescu’s sugges-
tions are instructive for another reason: They highlight an
issue that requires more attention from political philoso-
phy: the political relevance of moral psychology.What if
it could be shown that voter decision-making is prone to
systematic biases and distortions, and what if a reason-
able case can be made that these psychological patterns
are mirrored in the structure of problems such as climate
change or global injustice? What if democracy is only
viable or sustainable with citizens who possess specific
moral views or moral capacities—and what if they lack
them? How could we reconcile democratic ideals with
evidence of moral incompetence in voters?
This paper seeks to explore this tension between dem-
ocratically illicit manipulation and the possibility that dem-
ocratic outcomesmight yield catastrophic outcomes. In the
following section, we will make the case for the incom-
patibility of severe voter manipulation and democracy.
However, we will then argue (in the section “Democracy’s
dilemma: The perils of popular power”) that quickly
dismissing calls for mandatory moral enhancements might
be tempting but tends to overlook the key problem, the
other side of the tension, which provides the real challenge
for democratic theories: they have to take the possibility of
failure seriously. Failure, that is, not because of internal
instability, but because decision-making procedures may
lead to inacceptable outcomes. Taking serious indications
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that such outcomes are traceable to the psychology of the
voters, the proposal to democratically enhance the elector-
ate might not be a contradiction in terms, but rather a
viable strategy to create suitable preconditions for democ-
racy. Or so it may seem. The tension between the demo-
cratic requirement to not manipulate the input and the
demand of acceptable output touches upon the ground
layers of political theory. We suppose that severely manip-
ulating voters cannot be reconciled with democracy. How-
ever, in the final section (“Democratic perspectives and
solutions”) we will sketch other ways to address climate
change and global injustice. Although they require drastic
changes to the current political order, they are genuinely
democratic. For this reason alone, they should take priority
over moral bioenhancements.
Does Manipulation Undermine Legitimacy?
In the history of ideas, the suggestion to make citizens
morally more favorable inevitably reminds of a guiding
motif of communism, the creation of a Bnew man.^ The
utopia of truly free and equal persons requires for human-
kind to overcome animalistic drives, selfishness and an-
tisocial tendencies. Only the communist explanation for
humanity’s darker side differs from Persson and
Savulescu’s view: for communists, social existence de-
termines consciousness, not neurobiological or psycho-
logical shortcomings. Inner liberation follows outer lib-
eration, whereas the neuroscientific zeitgeist reverses this
relation. Trotsky foreshadowed this: Bpurely physiologi-
cal life will become subject to collective experiments^
[quoted in 4, p. 43], and it is said that Stalin’s favorite
metaphor for artists and educators was Bengineers of the
human soul^ [quoted after 5, p. 23]. Just like contempo-
rary transhumanists, communists suppose that the fate of
humankind depends on transforming human nature.
Among the reasons for communism’s historical failure
is that its attempts to reshape humanity never succeeded
and sometimes turned into murderous disaster. Surely, no
one proposes to revitalize communist re-education pro-
grams. But the striking resemblances between the bygone
utopia and futuristic transhumanists visions cannot and
should not pass unmentioned, particularly because west-
ern democracies countered communist aspirations of so-
cial engineering with pathos-laden proclamations of in-
dividual liberty and dignity. Normative individualism, the
linchpin of liberal democracies, seemingly leaves no
room for molding persons into politically favorably
minded citizens. It is no coincidence that one of the
inaugural works of modern democracy, Jean-Jacques
Rousseau’s The Social Contract, famously begins with
an outline of the key task of political philosophy: to
inquire the legitimacy of government Btaking men as
they are and laws as they can be made to be^ [6, p.
155]. This illustrates a tension: taking people as they are
is a cornerstone of democratic thought—moral enhance-
ment encapsulates the idea of turning people into what
they can be made to be.
Our guiding question is this: Does an elected govern-
ment rule legitimately (in a democratic sense of the term)
if it severely manipulated the will of the people in its
favor prior to the election and if voters had voted other-
wise without manipulation? We argue that it does not; it
lacks democratic legitimacy. While this might appear
self-evident, it is anything but agreed on in political
theory. In a recent survey article James Fishkin writes,
from Bthe standpoint of democratic theory, what, if any-
thing, is wrong with manipulation …? The answer de-
pends on your theory of democracy. On some theories,
there are no grounds for objections^ [7, p. 34].We wish
to go further and argue that irrespective of particular
models of democracy, basic considerations of the rela-
tion between government and citizens speak against the
possibility of a democratically legitimate government
elected by a will of the people it manipulated before.
Manipulation
The implications of manipulation for legitimacy are not
often discussed because the problems with defining what
constitutes manipulation stand in the foreground. As
often lamented, the concept of manipulation escapes a
precise definition (see [8–11]; and from a political point
of view [7, 12–14]). We cannot engage with the many
proposed accounts here, and fortunately, we do not have
to subscribe to a specific position or provide a sharp
definition ourselves. A rough approximation suffices:
We understand manipulation as the prima facie condem-
natory sub-forms of influence that are usually impermis-
sible and face a high burden of justification. Influence (on
voters) can be exerted via manifold means and to differ-
ent degrees, from communicative information and rhetor-
ic over mass media advertisements and propaganda to the
exploitation of psychological weaknesses, subliminal
priming, etc. Some forms might be permissible, others
outright illicit. The borderline where permissible influ-
ence turns into illicit manipulation is hard to pin down
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precisely. For the purposes of this paper it suffices to
stipulate that we conceive of manipulation as influence
that (at least) one person exhibits over another and that
alters choices, opinions or beliefs of the targeted person in
a way that she does not approve of, and that does not
correspond to the demands of rational thought, [cf. 15, p.
31]. In addition, manipulation involves a form of control
of the manipulator because the influence undermines or
bypasses control capacities of the manipulated.
We are aware that this is not a comprehensive, clear-
cut definition. It neither captures all cases, nor is it fine-
grained enough to solve borderline cases; it also fails to
adequately account for the role of emotions. Emotions
surely play a larger role in deliberation and (political)
decision-making than rationalistic philosophy and our
understanding of manipulation suggest.Many successful
and prima facie innocuous ways to influence others
involve emotional influence that undermines control ca-
pacities (recall when you fell in love last time). Assessing
the proper role of emotions is one of the key problems for
a complete theory of manipulation. However, such a
grand theory of manipulation is unnecessary for present
purposes. Two rather weak claims suffice: Instances of
illicit manipulation exist; and exposing others involun-
tarily to moral bioenhancements falls into this category.
With respect to particular interventions, much will
depend on their severity. Current debates on moral en-
hancement focus onmodest forms, [cf. 16, 17]. Consider
a Veggie Pill that helps you resist the temptations you
feel when ordering lunch. You like the taste of meat, but
you also think that it is morally wrong to eat it. The
Veggie Pill would support you to overcome your weak
will and to do what you think you should do, i.e. not
eating meat. You simply take a pill just before lunch.
Assume it does not have severe effects on your autono-
my or personality and that its effects wear off after one
hour. Such individual and voluntary enhancements with
minor short-term effects are, we contend, hardly prob-
lematic. A Veggie Pill even seems desirable. Although
vegetarianism helps solving ecological and food avail-
ability problems, such limited enhancements are insuffi-
cient to resolve the Bmega-problems of today.^ Over-
coming the consequences of psychological deficiencies
in voters requires far more severe, long-term and, most
worryingly, involuntary alterations of moral capacities
and beliefs on a population wide scale.1
The kind of moral bioenhancements we (and Persson
and Savulescu) have in mind are, e.g. psycho-
pharmaceuticals that alter one’s moral proclivities and
opinions, that modify selfish personality traits, eliminate
morally relevant biases, amplify solidarity with out-
groups or strengthen our Bsense of justice^. We further
assume that they have to be given involuntarily because
citizens do not consider themselves in need of moral
enhancements. Assessing such interventions seems rath-
er easy: If there are any instances of illicit manipulations,
intervening into brains, altering neurophysiological pa-
rameters of a person (without consent) seems one of its
paradigmatic forms. It is a far cry from skilled rhetoric, it
has abandoned communication in any meaningful sense
altogether [18]. These interventions do not provide ar-
guments, but work directly on biological properties of
the brain. They bypass the sphere of reasons, and there-
with, the rational faculties and control capacities of the
target. Altering the way a person thinks and feels
through modulating the neuronal configuration that un-
derlies such higher level mental processes and states is,
to us, a clear case of tinkering with another’s mind in a
prima facie impermissible way. If there is a moral duty
to not manipulate others, refraining from secretly or
coercively accessing her opinions on the neural level
seems to be among the first demands. Any theory of
manipulation that is unable to capture such interventions
would be unpersuasive. Thus, even without drawing the
borderline more precisely, we are confident that manda-
tory moral enhancements in the form envisioned by
Persson and Savulescu fall on the illegitimate side of it.2
What rather has to be shown is that there is a duty to
not manipulate others. In light of the value of autonomy,
we do not have any hesitation to assume a right against
being manipulated on the individual level (one of us
argued elsewhere that severe forms should constitute a
criminal offence [19]). Alteringmoral beliefs or political
opinions through brain interventions also likely violates
the human right to freedom of thought and conscience.
But here, we are interested in the collective level, in the
political consequences of manipulation. The suggestion
is that the demands of democratic legitimacy imply a
prohibition of government to manipulate voters. We
stress these points because a usual response to our
following claims is an argument about the precise limits
of permissible governmental influence. Of course, all
1 Cf. the paper by Schlag and the reply by Persson & Savulescu,
both in this volume.
2 Later in this paper we will discuss less drastic forms of illicit
governmental manipulation.
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governments somehow influence citizens’ moral dispo-
sitions, from civic school education or public broadcast-
ing services to pledges of allegiance and patriotic spec-
tacles. Every collective influences its member, and so-
cial psychology is ubiquitous. But be this as it may.
Taking a critical stance towards paradigmatic cases of
manipulation does not require drawing borderlines more
concretely.
Legitimacy
Legitimacy of state power is the central problem of
political philosophy—where does the power to rule
originate from, what sets legitimate rule apart from the
mere exercise of factual power? Although democracy
might well be an essentially contested concept and even
though dictatorships notoriously embraced the term, we
suppose that democracy answers these questions in a
distinct manner: The characteristic feature of democracy
is popular sovereignty, that is, the collective self-rule of
free and equal citizens. Governmental legitimacy de-
rives from the will of the people. And the will of the
people, in turn, emerges from the wills of individual
citizens. The ultimate source of governmental legitima-
cy lies in the political opinions and preferences of the
citizens. These opinions and preferences are, in the form
of votes, the input into the democratic system. Demo-
cratically legitimate governmental authority is essential-
ly grounded in this dimension; input legitimacy is a
necessary element of democratic rule.
Of course, this input element might not suffice for
legitimacy. Many democratic models require additional
output constraints, such as observing minority rights,
furthering the common good or even global justice.
Democratic models regularly seek to achieve or secure
desirable outputs by designing institutions that restrict
majoritarian input powers (such as constitutional rights
and judicial review). Furthermore, there may be other
forms of legitimate political authority. They might be
legitimate because they produce desirable outputs
(e.g., governance by not elected international organi-
zations). But if they derive legitimacy from outputs
only (rather than from the will of the people), they
lack democratic input legitimation. The question be-
fore us is then whether governments can manipulate
the input dimension, the will of the people, to secure
proper outputs, without falling into this latter catego-
ry. Let us look at this in some detail.
Simple Formal Theories: Aggregation of Preferences
Abasal understanding of democracy can be summarized
as the correct aggregation of the preferences of the
people under a simple idea of equality such as Bone
man, one vote.^ Government truly reflects the will of
the people if and only if majoritarian preferences pre-
vail. In other words: there has to be a correspondence
relation between the will of the people, the outcome of
an electoral process, the composition of the elected
representative legislative body (parliament), and gov-
ernment. This correspondence relation is a minimum
requirement, beyond dispute in principle, although mit-
igated in practice. The correspondence requirement does
not extend to each and every political decision. Once
elected, representative governments are not bound by
the will of the people in every single decision theymake.
Leeway to deviate from the general will is what sets
representative forms apart from direct democracies. It is
one of the central arguments against direct models that
ordinary voters might not fully oversee the complexities
and consequences of politics and that the will of the
people is better mediated by a layer of experts and
parliamentary processes. However, the possibility to
depart from public opinion in particular decisions does
not call the correspondence requirement in question.
Simple aggregative models of democracy might not
stipulate further demands. Whatever the preferences of
the people—and however they came about—, as long as
they are correctly registered and aggregated, the legiti-
macy conditions are met. As a consequence, such
models might not explicitly object to manipulation of
the electorate or call into question the legitimacy of the
government elected after manipulation. However, these
models may overlook a general argument against the
compatibility of governmental legitimacy and manipu-
lation which we will unpack in a minute.
Moreover, simple models are not particularly attrac-
tive from a normative perspective. Proponents such as
Walter Lippmann or Joseph Schumpeter in fact sub-
scribed to them because of their deep distrust against
the capacity of ordinary voters. Uneducated, longing for
easy answers, and susceptible to influence, the role of
voters is restricted to choosing between competing elites.
As Lippmann beautifully wrote about Bordinary minds^:
In the uncriticized parts of the mind there is a vast
amount of association by mere clang, contact, and
succession. There are stray emotional attachments,
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there are words that were names and are masks. In
dreams, reveries, and panic, we uncover some of
the disorder, enough to see how the naive mind is
composed, and how it behaves when not disci-
plined by wakeful effort and external resistance.
We see that there is no more natural order than in a
dusty old attic. There is often the same incongruity
between fact, idea, and emotion as there might be
in an opera house, if all the wardrobes were
dumped in a heap and all the scores mixed up, so
that Madame Butterfly in a Valkyr’s dress waited
lyrically for the return of Faust. [20, p. 405 f.]
Based on this pessimistic view Lippmann argues that
only representative public officials—not individual cit-
izens—have the time, training and knowledge to make
informed decisions and advocates a kind of Socratic re-
education of the people [20, Ch. XXVII]. As a conse-
quence, the input dimension—and thereby the impor-
tance of voters—is marginalized in favor of expert rule.
Such elitist models can be understood as answers to
the problem of deficient input quality. Many objections
have been raised against elitism, precisely because of its
shallow level of citizen participation and its disregard
for the input dimension. Even though many existing
democracies may resemble elitist models, to critics they
are democracies by appearance only. Correspondence
may thus be a necessary but not a sufficient condition.
BFree Formation^ of the Will
Most theories of democracy demand more: the will of
the people has to be formed in certain ways, or nega-
tively, it must not have been formed in ways flouting
basic democratic ideals. Many models therefore require
the free formation of the will, expressed, for instance, in
the European Electoral Principles. The third principle,
called Bfree suffrage^, secures the Bfreedom of voters to
form an opinion^ [21, at 3.1.a]. A free and fair election
(Bfree suffrage^) is a precondition for the legitimate rule
of the elected. Accordingly, governments cannot influ-
ence voting behavior without losing legitimacy. The
notion of free suffrage needs further explication: What
does Bfree^mean, and why is it a necessary condition of
legitimate rule? The general idea is that the formation of
the public will should be free from certain kinds of
distorting, manipulating, autonomy undermining influ-
ences. A different formulation encapsulating the same
idea might be instructive: A central tenet of classic
democracy is that legitimacy of governments, or, in the
words of one of the founding documents, the US Dec-
laration of Independence, Bjust powers^ derive Bfrom
the consent of the governed.^ In today’s understanding,
normatively relevant consent is informed consent,
which places some qualifications on the way it has been
brought about.3 Non-manipulation is one of them [22].
But as not every democratic theory accepts it as a
necessary condition for legitimacy, we wish to develop
an argument showing that the Bfree suffrage^ principle
is indeed essential to democracy by comparing voter
manipulation with other forms of legitimacy
undermining governmental conduct.
Coercion
Coercion is the easiest case. Formation of the will is not
free if voters were coerced, e.g., by intimidating threats
at the polling station. Irrespective of the finer details of
the debate whether a coerced agent acts according to his
preferences by giving in to a threat (she may, for in-
stance, prefer her life over voting for her favorite party)
[23, 24], coercion is a paradigm case of heteronomous
influence that nullifies voluntariness. Because will for-
mation was not free, government cannot derive legiti-
macy from the will of the people. Absence of coercion is
thus a precondition for legitimacy conferring free
elections.
Deception
A perhaps less obvious, but still clear case is intentional
deception. Suppose a government wrongly informed the
public on an important matter before an election in
which it is re-elected. Suppose further that it had a legal
duty to disclose the matter truthfully, and that the issue
played a decisive role for voters (such as a drastic
misstatement of unemployment figures or a
Clintonesque affair in personalized elections). Many
pro-government voters truthfully complain that they
would not have voted the way they did had they known
the relevant facts. Does the elected government rule
legitimately? While it does represent the will of the
people in the moment of the election, it is hard to deny
3 Regarding informed consent, we wish to stress that votes do not
have to be informed, just as medical decisions do not have to be.
Many voters probably have no comprehension of the issues at
stake. However, voters—and other decision-makers—must have
the chance to be informed, relevant information must be available.
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that the will of the people was formed faultily because of
the deception. Surely, politicians notoriously spin, bend
and embellish facts before elections. Nonetheless, de-
ceptions of some gravity violate a necessary condition
of a free (and informed) formation of the will. As a
consequence, government’s legitimacy cannot be based
on the election. It would be absurd if governments could
ground their legitimacy in the will of the people it has
deceptively influenced before.
The legitimacy problemmight become clearer from a
different angle. One could deny that the electoral out-
come reflects the will of the people. Given their prefer-
ences, they would not have voted for the government if
they had known the facts to which they were entitled.
Their choice did thus not reflect their preferences in that
objective situation, only those on the incorrect assump-
tion of different conditions. One may argue that the
correspondence requirement is not met and the electoral
outcome does not reflect the Breal^ will of the people.
On the political level, access to truthful information
then becomes a precondition of democratic legitimacy.
For this reason, freedom of speech and freedom of press
are conceived as political rights. Censoring opinions and
facts not only violates the rights of censored speakers,
but also undermines the will formation of the people.
We suppose that most theories of democracy will agree
that deception undermines legitimacy, albeit voting pro-
cedure and aggregation were performed correctly.
Altering Short-Term Preferences
A different kind of influence undermines free will for-
mation in the next scenario. Suppose that opinions of
voters are altered through some manipulative interfer-
ence in the proximity of the polling booth, for instance,
by rhetorically skilled agitators who exert systematic
and severe emotional and situational pressure on voters.
Imagine these influences are successful. Upon reflection
and out of their reach, voters reassert their previous
opinions. In that case, the free formation of the voter’s
will is undermined. To protect against such short-term
opinion changes, many countries install safeguards: no
political advertisements and campaigning at polling sta-
tions, no disclosure of estimates on Election Day (or
several days before). The objective is, again, to avoid
unwise voting decisions because of last-minute manip-
ulative influences, lacking time to reflect, and to provide
more favorable external conditions for freely forming
one’s opinion. The presence of such influences under-
mines a free and fair election.
This is even truer of biochemical manipulation.
Imagine an odorless substance such as Oxytocin is
sprayed in the polling booth and effectively alters voting
behavior. Again, the will has not been formed freely.
The outcome might correspond to the preferences of
voters in the moment of voting. But these are not the
real preferences, they are transiently manipulated ones.
In analogy to Harry Frankfurt’s famous distinction, one
may speak of a conflict between situational first and
longer-term second order political preferences. Elections
are concerned with the latter. The polling booth is the
symbol of the freedom of the vote—free from, e.g.,
influence, pressure, need of justifications, or potential
repercussions.
Paradox of Long-Term Preferences Manipulation
The key question is whether that freedom should extend
beyond the voting booth to the formation of the will in
general. The moral enhancement programs Persson and
Savulescu envision cause more permanent, durable
transformation of preferences. They can be considered
as extensions of transient manipulation. This leads to an
argument a fortiori: If less invasive manipulation calls
legitimacy into question, stronger ones do so all the
more.
However, long term preference manipulation raises a
well-known problem, the paradox of thorough manipu-
lation. Imagine a sinister neuroscientist manages to re-
place the entire preference structure of a person. This
surely constitutes manipulation, although, if successful
and severe enough, the discrepancy between first and
second order preferences vanishes. As a consequence,
opinions have truly changed, and the post-manipulation
person will argue and defend her novel views as her
own, she might wholeheartedly identify with them. At
some point, the manipulated will becomes the will of the
manipulated person.
For our inquiry, this means that even if new elections
were held, the result would not change. The elected
government does represent the will of the people, the
correspondence requirement obtains. The structure of
the problem is familiar from the free-will debate
[24–26]. But instead of engaging with this debate here,
we offer a different argument that directly pertains to the
idea of democracy. Even if one considers a thoroughly
manipulated person free in regard to moral
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responsibility, we deny that her votes can confer legiti-
macy onto the manipulating government. The classic
case is political indoctrination. Indoctrination runs coun-
ter to democratic ideals. However, we forsake from
employing the term Bindoctrination^ for our purposes
because its vagueness would further complicate matters.
The reason why long-term alterations (and indoctrina-
tion) undermine legitimacy is that the election concerns
and benefits the manipulator herself. Even if the manip-
ulated person is to be considered responsible vis-à-vis
third parties, she is not responsible vis-à-vis the manip-
ulator with respect to the manipulated aspects. Manipu-
lation creates a hierarchical relation of control between
manipulator and manipulated. And as responsibility
tracks control, the person who directs and steers a pro-
cess, be it through natural forces or other persons, bears
responsibility. Actions of the manipulated are ascribed
to the manipulator. In a similar way as persons can act
through (or mediated by) tools or technology, manipu-
lators act through the manipulated. A capo controlling a
gang never makes his hands dirty. But he cannot wash
them in innocence. Actions of gang members are as-
cribed to him, they are his actions. Whether the subor-
dinates are also responsible is irrelevant here. What
matters is that a manipulator acts, normatively, through
the manipulated.4
In democratic terms, conferring legitimacy is a one-
directional, bottom-up relation: from citizens onto gov-
ernments. It does not work conversely. If governments
severely manipulate the will of individuals—and there-
by, of the people as a whole—a circular relation ensues.
Government is not representing the will of the people,
but vice versa. To put it differently: Because acts of the
manipulated are ascribed to the manipulator, a govern-
ment manipulating voters would, in the end, elect itself.
This cannot confer legitimacy. There is an asymmetry:
The power of government has to derive from the will of
people, but the will of the people cannot derive from the
will of government. Governmental manipulation of the
will of the people thus contradicts democratic essentials;
it cannot ground legitimacy in the will it manipulated.
Manipulation and legitimacy are incompatible. This
general relation, we contend, applies to any democratic
theory that recognizes the will of the people as the sole
source of legitimacy (and thus, even to simple aggrega-
tive models previously discussed).5 In the following
section, we try to strengthen this rather abstract argu-
ment by discussing its place in several particular theo-
ries of democracy.
Supporting the Argument: Particular Accounts
of Democracy
BLiberal^ Democracies: Rights as Constraints
of Governmental Powers
Although the term Bliberal democracy^ is not clearly
defined, it summons the idea that public power is bound
by pre-political rights which create a sphere of liberty,
not subject to majoritarian decision-making. It com-
prises elements fundamental to the idea of free and equal
citizens. John Rawls, for instance, enumerates a set of
basic liberties in his Theory of Justice. One of them is
the Bright to freedom of conscience^, which includes
moral freedom. In fact, Rawls writes that Bequal liberty
of conscience is the only principle that the persons in the
original position can acknowledge^ [27, p. 207, empha-
sis added].
In this view, forming opinions and decisions freely is
a guarantee that sets outer limits to governmental pow-
ers. A state-run moral enhancement program likely con-
travenes this liberal premise. One might dispute that
freedom of conscience is a necessary element in a basic
set of liberal rights. However, we suggest that this right
is not just coincidentally included in many of such sets
but that it is internally connected to the idea of democ-
racy, so that its observance is a precondition of
legitimacy.
Value of Democracy: Brettschneider and Dworkin
An argument for such a necessary connection can be
found in Corey Brettschneider’s Bvalue theory of
democracy.^ Among its central claims is that collective
4 The following example might be helpful: If Amanipulates B into
harming C, C might not only complain to B but also to A because
she controlled B’s actions. A, in turn, cannot complain over B’s
action, because she herself brought it about. A would have to
complain to herself as B’s act can be attributed to her.
5 One might object that a government could be democratically
empowered to use moral enhancements to change its people (just
as individuals can bind themselves with Ulysses-style contracts).
Such a collective decision might indeed not necessarily render the
government illegitimate, but only if the decision is unanimous,
which is hardly conceivable. As soon as there is a single dissenter,
the majority decision would not be binding for her. Ulysses-style
autonomy-waivers only work for the affected persons and cannot
extend to the autonomy of others.
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democratic self-rule requires respecting every citizen as
a self-ruler, which in turn preconditions respect for
particular substantive democratic or political rights such
as free speech and freedom of thought:
BRights to express and to listen to ideas are justified
by the more basic right of citizens to make up their own
minds about politics^ [28, p. 45]. Brettschneider asks
his readers to imagine a situation relevantly similar to
ours. What if it were predictable that citizens would vote
for morally wrong options?
It is clear that any attempt to force citizens to vote a
particular way would be a paradigmatic violation
of the democratic right to freedom of conscience.
The reasons why such a forced vote is unaccept-
able in a democracy are not merely instrumental;
they go to the heart of what it means to treat
citizens as sovereign. The ability to decidewrongly
is itself a fundamental democratic right. In no sense
can citizens be regarded as rulers if restrictions are
placed on how they can think about politics, espe-
cially when it comes to how they vote. Freedom of
conscience is essential to democracy—particularly
to the core value of political autonomy—because it
ensures that self-rulers will be able to think for
themselves [28, p. 45].
Brettschneider’s argument about forcing voters equal-
ly applies to manipulating them. Both disrespect the
citizen as sovereign. In a similar vein, Ronald Dworkin
contends that we do not value democracy as a function of
majority rule [29, 30]. Dworkin’s Bpartnership
conception^ of democracy [29, p. 382 ff.] requires, inter
alia, that government leaves it to the individual how to
think about politics and ethics. And because ethics and
political philosophy go hand in hand, Bendorsement [of
an act or vote] must be genuine, and it is not genuine
when someone is hypnotized or brainwashed or fright-
ened into conversion. Endorsement is genuine only
when it is itself the agent’s performance, not the result
of another person’s thoughts being piped into his brain^
[31, p. 269]. Dworkin and Brettschneider establish nec-
essary links between political rights such as freedom of
conscience and democratic political orders.
Republican Models: Pettit
The idea can also be found in republican models, the
traditional counterpart to liberal approaches. Republican
models do not cordon off basic rights from majoritarian
decision-making in the more principled manner than
liberal theories do. They allow—and demand—orienta-
tion of policies toward the common good. While liberal
models stress interests and preferences of individuals,
possibly pursuing self-centered goals and disinterested
in others, republicans seek to strengthen the polity,
active citizen participation in the political process and
common understanding. Echoing a distinction by Jon
Elster, one may say that liberals tend to equate elections
and political will formation with markets whereas re-
publicans are more interested in the forum.
In Philipp Pettit’s version, the core of the republican
tradition is Bnon-domination: the condition under which
you live in the presence of other people but at the mercy
of none^ [32, p. 80]. The notion of non-domination is
different from negative freedom, since B[w]hat consti-
tutes domination is the fact that in some respect the
power-bearer has the capacity to interfere arbitrarily,
even if they are never going to do so^ [32, p. 63].
Domination can thus occur without actual interference.
One only lives Bat the mercy of none^ if no one has the
capacity to interfere arbitrarily.
This understanding of republican liberty also implies
certain basic structures in the relation between citizen and
the state that reject manipulation of voters. AsPettit puts it:
The lesson is that the instruments used by the
republican state should be, as far as possible,
non-manipulable.…. No one individual or group
should have discretion in how the instruments are
used. No one should be able to take them into their
own hands: not someone who is entirely benefi-
cent and public-spirited, and certainly not some-
one who is liable to interfere for their own sec-
tional ends in the lives of their fellow citizens. The
institutions and initiatives involved should not
allow of manipulation at anyone’s individual
whim [32, p. 173].
Deliberative Models: Habermas
The paradigm case against manipulation of will or
voters comes from deliberative theories, e.g., in wake
of the work of Jürgen Habermas. According to him,
political decisions are legitimate if and only if they result
from a specific process of decision-making, namely
from a structured deliberative discourse. The procedure
forms the basis of legitimacy. It implies public reasoning
open to all citizens aiming at mutual understanding. It
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should take place in a neutral public sphere, preferably
under ideal speech conditions which are characterized
by equality, recognition of other viewpoints and the
absence of power and might. In such conditions, Bno
force except that of the better argument is exercised^
[33, p. 108, cf. 34]. The hope is that the deliberative
decision-making process yields outcomes everyone has
reasons to accept [35, 36]. The better argument, then, is
only identifiable through the proper procedure.
The task of the constitutional state is to establish the
framework and suitable background conditions for de-
liberative discourse. Beside free press, this includes
rights against manipulative influences on political will
formation. Surely, as its name suggests, such speech
situations are ideal and, just as free deliberation among
equal citizens, probably never fully attainable. But they
serve as regulative ideals which can be approximated.
Indoctrination or tampering with others’ emotions or
neuronal structures is diametrically opposed to these
requirements. Moral enhancement substitute the force
of the better argument with the force of pharmacology.
Mandatory enhancements are a paradigmatic form of
overwhelming power. And they bypass the Bsphere of
reasons^ altogether and work on the biochemical level
alone. Any theory inspired by deliberative ideals must
reject moral enhancement programs.
Equal Influence on Public Opinion
A final element inherent to democracy should briefly be
mentioned: equality. But equality of what? While the
Bone man – one vote^ scheme which accords the same
voting power to the uneducated as to the Nobel laureate
is an indispensable part of contemporary democracies,
one might make the case that democracy requires more.
If one takes serious the idea of an association of free and
equal citizens who jointly reason about the common
good, equality might need to expand to Bhaving an equal
say^ before the ballot is cast. Citizens should have equal
opportunities to present their views and persuade others
in the struggle of political ideas. Equality of influence
then becomes a further distinct element of democracy.
Today’s real political conditions are marked by stark
inequalities of influence, aptly proven by the importance
of campaign financing. Due to lacking access to mass
media, the voices of many, particularly marginalized
populations, are not heard by the public at large. This is
a serious shortcoming of the current state of democracy. It
would be exacerbated if some groups have novel means
to change public opinion such as moral enhancements at
their disposal. In terms of equality, thesemeans have to be
available to everyone participating in the forum.
To summarize: The foregoing theories, and there-
with, most contemporary accounts of democracy, reject
the manipulation of the will formation of the electorate
through biochemical means because it runs contrary to
central ideas of democracy. Democratic legitimacy ne-
cessitates a strong input-element. But the will of the
people cannot confer legitimacy if it was manipulated.
Thus, the right to remain free from such influences on
political opinion formation is a necessary political right,
just like the right to vote or freedom of the press.
Interferences with the free formation of the will of the
people undermine the legitimacy of the government.
Even though it was elected, it lacks a necessary element
of justification, namely, input-legitimacy. The political
system Persson and Savulescu hint at would be a pseu-
do-democracy, populated by institutions, elements and
procedures typical for democracies, but hollow inside,
void of the legitimacy conferring element.
Democracy’s Dilemma: The Perils of Popular Power
It might be tempting to end at this point and dismiss
Persson and Savulescu’s suggestions as contrary to es-
sential democratic ideas. But that would be too simple.
The tension between input and acceptable output is a key
problem for democratic theory too often neglected or
even pretentiously rejected. It is a challenge that has to
be taken seriously because it imperils the plausibility of
the democratic project at its heart. Democracies are not a
priori immune from the danger of insufficient input.
History shows that the will of the majority can go disas-
trously wrong.Many unacceptable outputs are preempted
by majoritarian constraints. But not all of them: Climate
change and global injustice are evident examples in
which usual safeguards—in their current form—fail. In-
put problems have occupied democratic theorists ever
since. In this section, we show that, somewhat surpris-
ingly, many democratic theories presuppose transforming
political preferences and creating democratic citizens.
Let us assume, arguendo, that democracies might pro-
duce bad, even outright morally unjust outcomes because
they amplify problematic tendencies of human psycholo-
gy. This puts the spot on one of the notorious Achilles’
heels of democracy: its outcome depends on inputs of
contingent quality (colloquially, a garbage in – garbage
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out problem). Consequently, the idea of failure has to be
taken seriously. Positive outcomes appear to require dis-
tinct psychological capacities of voters (just as they may
require favorable social conditions). Simply assuming that
citizens possess these qualities would be naïve, especially
in light of psychological findings to the contrary.
How Democracy can fail
At this point, we need to briefly explain in which sense
democracies can fail. How, adherents of input-
democracies may object, is it even possible that democ-
racy leads to erroneous output? Such a contention pre-
supposes a yardstick, an independent standard, against
which outcomes can be measured. Input-accounts may
conceive this as misleading; there are no failure condi-
tions built into democratic theory. The decision brought
about through the right procedure is the democratically
correct result. Input legitimizes output. Evaluating results
in light of standards not themselves generated through
democratic procedures is, ultimately, anti-democratic. It
makes the correctness of democratic decisions contin-
gent upon conformity with a non-democratic standard.
Indeed, external standards are hard to justify by prin-
ciples of input-democracy alone. However, and here lies
the catch which input-theories have to acknowledge, at
least in principle:What if a strong argument in favor of a
basic set of substantive political goals can be made?
Proponents of moral enhancement, for instance, resort
to goals no less significant than the survival of human-
kind in face of weapons of mass destruction, minimal
standards of global justice (e.g., tackling easily prevent-
able deaths due to malnutrition and lacking access to
health care), and the aversion of grave effects of climate
change. These goals, we believe, are hardly contestable
from a moral point of view. Any democratic theory that
does not accord them heightened importance is
impoverished to the extent that its justification loses
plausibility. These are not just goals one may espouse
or reject. Rather, they are, in Rawlsian terms, part of the
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive
moral doctrines. While one may argue about details,
there does not seem to be reasonable disagreement as
to the fact that these are important goals, nor that current
domestic and international politics systematically fail to
address them in a satisfying manner. If that is the case,
the issue before us is not merely a variant of the familiar
quarrels over liberal state neutrality vs. value oriented
policies. Rather, it touches upon the more existential
question whether democracies can fail to deliver outputs
necessary under all reasonable moral theories.
Strong input-theories are committed to value the
pursuit of these goals only if the popular will tells so.
But that is a weak and potentially fatal line of response.
The persuasiveness of input democracies pales in light
of the moral importance of these goals. We have to
acknowledge the possibility that the popular will can
err. Although this is a serious concession, input-theories
have to be amended with output-constraints. And, in
fact, hardly any democratic theory does without some
output correction.
Most existing democratic systems impose constraints
on public power in the form of negative constraints, e.g.
constitutional rights. However, restricting the scope of
public power may not suffice to solve present problems
because coordinated, large scale positive state action is
required to address global injustice or further a carbonless
industry. And the bleak implication of our assumption is
that governments that pursue such necessary but unpop-
ular policies will not be re-elected. Simply constraining
public power does not suffice; positive action in the
right direction has to be taken.
Against this backdrop, modifying the input dimension
seems a viable proposal.We have already encountered one
such strategy, Schumpeterian elitist democracy: marginal-
ize the weak element, the role of voters, and leave the rest
to professionals. But this already comes close to conceding
defeat for democracy. At best, it is Bdemocracy light^,
without guarantee of a happy end. Real world politics
demonstrate that elitist and expert democracies do not
necessarily further the common good.
A better alternative might indeed lie in improving
input, just as proponents of state-directed moral en-
hancement suggest. Flourishing democracies cannot be
founded, as Kant wrote, by a Bnation of devils^. De-
mocracies need democrats, homo democraticus, whose
interests reach beyond immediate self-related ones. De-
mocracy is only as good as the people it engages. In fact,
the need to make citizens better, suitable for democracy,
and the dangers of giving the masses too much power
have been recognized by democratic thinkers ever since.
Creating Citoyens
Let us return to Rousseau. Fully aware that the will of
the people in the form of aggregated individual wills, the
volonté de tous, does not correspond to the public inter-
est, the volonté générale, he made two suggestions: In
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clear contrast to the opening statement of The Social
Contract, quoted above, he fiercely advocated
reforming the human character and creating citizens as
laid out in his novel Emile, often considered the incep-
tion of modern educational theory. On the political level,
Rousseau introduced the—quasi-religious and some-
what dark—figure of the lawgiver. His task is to con-
vince alienated, hostile, and vicious people to engage in a
ground-shifting venture, namely to waive their natural
rights in order to conclude the social contract, in short,
ending their bourgeois existence and becoming
citoyens. The lawgiver has to be an Beducator^ and a
Bleader,^ someone with a Bgreat soul^ and Btrue virtue^
in order to overcome human degeneration. He should be
capable, as it were, of changing human nature; of
transforming every individual, who in himself is a
complete and independent whole, into part of a
greater whole, from which he receives in some
manner his life and his being; of altering man’s
constitution in order to strengthen it; of substitut-
ing a social and moral existence for the indepen-
dent and physical existence which we have all
received from nature. In a word, it is necessary
to deprive man of his native powers in order to
endow him with some which are alien to him, and
of which he cannot make use without the aid of
other people [6, p. 181].
Because of his proposal to radically alter human
nature in the name of the common good, Rousseau is
often suspected as anti-democratic. But the tension be-
tween individual interests and the common good is not a
peculiarity of Rousseau’s work. It marks a basic tension
within democratic theory. Even though it has not es-
caped notice by democratic theories, it is rarely given
center stage.
Some, such as John Stuart Mill, sought to alter the
input dimension by denying equal input, giving the
well-educated and more competent citizens greater vot-
ing powers—surely no promising answer in light of
today’s democratic standards. Other thinkers tacitly
dwell on optimism, often founded in the—widely sup-
posed—transformative power of democratic politics.
Democracy has beneficial impact on the character
of citizens, e.g., because of the constant need for
public justification. Yet, these effects are apparently
not enough to form democratic characters of a qual-
ity guaranteeing good outcomes.
Other theorists who are aware of the problem that
untutored preferences may result in inacceptable demo-
cratic outcomes present different strategies: Pettit sug-
gests to take particular questions where Bpopular
passion^ reigns and leads to inacceptable outcomes
out of democratic control in order to Bdepoliticize
democracy^ [37]. This is a serious concession. Michael
Sandel’s republicanism, by contrast, rejects the idea to
take Bpeople’s existing preferences, whatever they may
be, and tr[y] to satisfy them.^ Rather, in line with the
classic Greek political tradition and not unlike Rous-
seau, it Brequires that citizens possess, or come to ac-
quire, certain qualities of character, or civic virtues^ [38,
p. 5 f.]. Republicanism is Ba formative politics, a politics
that cultivates in citizens the qualities that self-
government requires.^ BMoral character^, he writes,
Bis a public, not merely a private, concern^ [38, p. 25].
John Rawls addresses the problem from a different
angle. For one, he bypasses it by stipulation. In his A
Theory of Justice, citizens are devoid of a rich and
problematic psychology. Although mutually disinterest-
ed, they possess a sense of justice. Furthermore, a lot of
work in Rawls’s account is done by the notion of public
reason and restrictions of which reasons count as per-
missible. Deliberating upon the essential framework of a
just society, citizens have a civic duty to only present a
special set of reasons, public reasons, potentially accept-
able to anyone. To him, Bvoting is not a private and
personal matter^ [39]. Not because the public is allowed
to alter or manipulate votes, but because voters have the
duty to curtail their own reasoning and will formation.
The public reason requirement thus ensures from the
very beginning that self-regarding or anti-social prefer-
ences cannot prevail in the democratic procedure.
Deliberative theories place their hopes in collective
rationality. The initial preferences with which individ-
uals enter deliberations are transformed and refined
though the inherent powers of reason, as engendered
in rational discourse. Non-universalizable and merely
self-regarding interests are cancelled out in the process.
The procedure transforms preferences, leading to—
hopefully widely agreeable—rational outcomes. The
quintessence of deliberativism is overcoming initial in-
dividual preferences in search of the common good
though discourse.
These examples show, perhaps surprisingly, that
many democratic theories presuppose that citizens’ pref-
erences have to be transformed and that justifiable dem-
ocratic outcomes may require creating democratic
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citizens. The widely criticized communist idea of
remolding humankind can, in fact, be traced to the
inceptive period of modern democracy – Enlighten-
ment. The new “sciences of men”—and the often materi-
alistic view—afforded to link the human condition to
social, political and economic circumstances and there-
by provided the opportunity for reform [5, Ch. 2]. Rous-
seau is a focal point of two diverging trajectories in the
history of ideas: the liberal democratic tradition and the
communist creation of “new man”, both merely empha-
sizing different aspects. These trajectories also mirror
the previously mentioned tension within democratic
theory: Some—especially simple liberal aggregative
models—take preferences as they are; others are more
demanding and imply preference transformation
through refashioning citizens’ moral character,
restricting the set of relevant reason, or through the
rationality filter of collective deliberation. The former
theories fall prey to outcome based objections such as
those of Persson and Savulescu. Perhaps, then, moral
enhancement should be understood as a continuation of
the transformative projects of the latter theories with
different means. If democratic societies must inculcate
their values in citizens, and if given preferences cannot
therefore be declared sacrosanct, moral enhancement
might be a novel way to secure democracy’s very foun-
dations. Rather than opposing the democratic project, it
furthers widely endorsed aims.
Since skepticism about deliberative politics is war-
ranted, moral enhancement might even be the more
feasible option [40, p. 24]. Deliberativism’s ideal condi-
tions will never be approximable, let alone attainable, in
modern states comprising millions of citizen. And even
if they were, whether rational discourse does possess the
transformative powers ascribed to it remains an open,
empirical, question. Arguments in the line of Persson
and Savulescu are much closer to psychological realities
than a Habermasian vision of discourse so abstract that
it cancels out the person and its pathologies altogether in
the idea of a Bsubjectless discourse.^ Deliberative theo-
ries, desirable as they may be, are rather a thought
experiment that helps to justify state authority in ideal
worlds, but do not provide feasible real world options.
We have thus the suspicion that many democratic
theories do not address the problem adequately because
they do not pay close attention to individual persons and
their psychological dispositions. Even though the claim
that bad societies produce bad citizens sounds like a
platitude, the problem is still alive and pressing. Moral
psychology puts the task for democratic theory right on
the table: High theory has to meet ordinary individuals
[see, e.g., 41]. A convincing theory of democracy has to
take psychological deficiencies serious and cannot
dwell in idealized assumption and wishful thinking. In
face of such considerations, moral enhancement may
appear as a realpolitikal solution to a repressed problem.
Critical Assessment
However, the fact that theorists have acknowledged the
problem and accommodated it in theories merely marks
the problem, but it does not soothe the inner tension
between preference engineering and democracy.
Sandel’s formative project, for instance, is under criti-
cism precisely for its anti-democratic tendencies [42].
The governmental aim of bending the views of those
who confer power onto them in its favor cannot easily
be reconciled with democratic legitimacy. Further lines
have to be drawn. In general, the aim to influence
thoughts and opinions might not undermine legitimacy
across the board because some means are more in line
with democratic ideals than others: The means matter,
and so do degrees.
First, one should not analogize civic education of
children and moral enhancement of the general populace
[43]. The normative relation between parents and the state
vis-à-vis children (and their future) who do not yet have a
fully developed preference structure and opinion forming
capacities is too dissimilar to the relation between gov-
ernment and citizens as bearers of political power. Dem-
ocratic education raises problems for democratic legiti-
macy on its own [44], but the transformative project
would be much less worrisome if it only entailed educa-
tion of children (as, e.g., suggested by Rousseau).
Second, democratic ideals are more hospitable to
certain methods: first and foremost, argument, dis-
course, and rational persuasion. Hearts and minds of
voters have to be won with ideas. Irrespective of partic-
ular theories, the proper mode of democratic will for-
mation is rational argument. If political opinions are
altered by the force of the better argument, democracy
is not undermined, even if government is involved in the
communicative process. Democracy is a collaborative
project playing in the space of reason. And if voters
suffer from shortcomings in reasoning, they have to be
persuaded that they do so and motivated to overcome
them through voluntary means (which can include mor-
al enhancements).
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Our insistence on the idea that only some means to
change minds are consistent with democracy is not, as
sometimes suggested, contradicted by the fact that all
will formation is influenced and that preferences can
change non-rationally. People may, for instance, uncon-
sciously adapt their preferences to what they can reason-
ably expect to attain (Bsour grapes^). Sandel mocks the
Bspectacle of ‘free men’ going to the polls^ as illusion-
ary [38, p. 204]. However, democratic legitimacy does
not presuppose fully independent, unencumbered selves.
Opinions are never formed freely, in the sense of free
from any external influence. On the contrary, influence
is ubiquitous, and everyone who forms her opinion in
exchange with others is subject to introspectively un-
aware influences. But this does not necessarily render
her will formation unfree. The fact that many prefer-
ences and opinions are formed by unconscious influ-
ences does not render all distinctions meaningless. Con-
sidering argument as the proper mode of democratic
preference transformation does not imply that strongly
biased and emotionally laden political campaigns are
beyond scrutiny (think about current campaigns in Eu-
rope and the US that appeal to deep seated fears of
Binvasion^ by foreigners). But if they accompany sub-
stantive arguments, such emotional campaigns are less
clearly manipulative than direct brain interventions.
Whoever wishes to object to this distinction between
free and unfree formation in principle (rather than to
mere demarcations) would have to assert that illicit
manipulation does not exist at all, for instance, because
all means to alter another’s minds are normatively on a
par [45]. In this context, parity is an unfeasible claim
because it negates the very possibility to identify blame-
worthy psychological trickery (such as brainwashing or
indoctrination). So, we suggest that although its con-
tours are amorphous, illicit manipulative influence on
the will formation of others is a real phenomenon, and
that biochemical means of moral enhancement are in-
stances of it.6
Imagine the normative consequences: If moral en-
hancement were a permissible way to alter voters’ opin-
ions, then less invasive and less powerful means would
be all the more. Why then, for instance, should govern-
ments not indoctrinate and deceive citizens, e.g. through
propaganda, distorted facts about global warming or
media censure? Perhaps even less drastic means such
as well-designed omnipresent advertisements for charity
or public awareness campaigns for global justice pro-
jects might suffice. If effective, would not they be less
problematic than altering human psychology? Is the
practical futility of such a program the only objection?
Likewise, if voter incompetence is the source of the
problem, why not tackling it directly by screening for
competence and restricting franchise? Affected persons
may even conceive exclusion from voting as less bur-
densome than mandatory enhancement because, as low
turnout rates in western democracies indicate, many
people might prefer not having a vote and remain who
they are to beingmorally transformed. However, the fact
that stripping someone from the right to vote, the quin-
tessential political right, appears as less burdensome
than an alternative measure, casts strong doubts on the
latter’s compatibility with democracy. Indoctrination
and disenfranchisement are strikingly at odds with dem-
ocratic ideals. And if they are, so is moral enhancement.
All strategies to remedy deficiencies on the individ-
ual level by remolding citizens against their will through
severely manipulative means oppose democratic ideals.
At the same time, the possible need to do so lays
democracy’s inextricable inner contradictions open.
One simply cannot have both: popular sovereignty and
legitimacy for policies without public support. Moral
enhancement cannot provide an escape from the dilem-
ma. But the sheer necessity to alter the electorate is not
an argument for the compatibility with democracy. So,
to give a conclusive answer to our initial question: A
government elected by severely manipulated voters
lacks democratic legitimacy. And this applies to gov-
ernments following Persson and Savulescu’s sugges-
tions. However, recall that this does not necessarily
imply that such a government lacks any legitimacy: if
those who hold power—the people—do not endorse
combating global warming and injustice, and if these
goals are morally imperative, one may look for other,
output-based forms of legitimacy. But this is tantamount
to abandoning the democratic project.
Democratic Perspectives and Solutions
We are at a critical juncture: Do we need more democ-
racy—including citizen participation—or do we need
less, curtailing citizens’ influence? While moral
6 On a related note, we do not assume that opinions or preferences
are fixed or stable. They are often based on heuristics and may
change over time or in response to new information. The fact that
opinions are changed due to social interaction is not worrisome per
se, only if brought about through particular Bmanipulative^means.
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enhancement points in the latter direction, the former
might be the more promising and legitimacy preserving
direction. We suggest that global injustice and climate
change might actually be redressed by strengthening
democracy. Some of the biggest shortcomings of current
democratic rule might be overcome not by altering the
citizens but by expanding the citizenry.
One of the problematic psychological disposition—
geographical parochialism—has tremendous effects on
people who happen to live in distant countries. In a
globalized world many political (and private) actions
have effects (Bexternalities^) on people who are not
themselves part of the populace that makes up the de-
mos. The Global South does not have a vote in elections
in the US or the EU, although their policies have strong
impact on the Global South’s fate as bearers of global
economic injustice and of the effects of climate change,
both of which lead to malnutrition, other health-related
problems, even death; to political instability, and we
should not forget in these days, to global migration.
Geographical parochialism is problematic for demo-
cratic theory if we accept two points. First, the demos
cannot itself be determined democratically; it is thus not
democratically justified. And, second, a particular de-
mos cannot be justified by mere Bblood and soil^. As
Robert Goodinwrites: BThere is no principled reason for
settling on any of those, in and of themselves. It is
arbitrary, from a moral point of view, where we draw
the lines on the map. It is arbitrary, from a moral point of
view, to whom we happen to feel sentimentally attached
or with whom we happen to share a common history or
ancestry^ [46, p. 48]. Restricting the demos arbitrarily
violates an essential democratic idea, and its revitaliza-
tion can provide a promising solution to the problem:
everyone who is affected by a measure should have a
say in it: BEveryone who is affected by the decisions of a
government should have the right to participate in that
government^ [47, p. 64]. This principle counts all po-
tentially affected interests equally and has far-ranging
implications. Goodin notes:
By embracing all possible worlds, politically, this
expansive conception of ‘all possibly affected in-
terests’ causes the franchise to balloon dramatical-
ly and the scope for legitimate exclusions to shrink
accordingly. Virtually (maybe literally) everyone
in the world—and indeed everyone in all possible
future worlds—should be entitled to vote on any
proposal or any proposal for proposals. A
maximally extensive franchise, virtually (perhaps
literally) ignoring boundaries both of space and
of time, would be the only legitimate way of
constituting the demos to this more defensible
version of the ‘all possibly affected interests’
principle [46, p. 55].
If this version of modern cosmopolitanism sounds
too utopian, one might look out for means that help to
approximate the ideal global democracy [cf. 48]. One
option would be to continue enhancing the collaboration
between strong democratic national states, for example
in institutions such as the UN, IMF, WTO and the
OECD, [cf. 49]. This requires the inclusion of all
affected states, not only of a set number of member
states. Moreover, many of these institutions—for
instance the IMF—will need internal reform in order
to yield just policies [for a discussion of cosmopol-
itanism and multinational collaboration see, 50]. The
nascent political idea of global constitutionalism
points in the same direction.
Current politics is not only shortsighted with regards
to faraway people, but also towards the future. This
temporal parochialism of current politics makes prog-
ress in fighting anthropogenic climate change notori-
ously difficult. It is indeed difficult to include future
generations in the political process. As the non-
existing cannot speak for themselves, one option to
include their interests is to have them represented
through a proxy, for example by assigning a certain
number of seats in parliament for people who speak on
behalf of future generations [51, 52]. These proxies can,
for example, be representatives of environmental
NGOs. Another option would be the introduction of
age conditions under which political power is exercised,
for example by introducing a maximum voting age,
lowering the minimum voting age, or by making the
weight of a person’s vote age-sensitive [53]. Such pro-
posals might promote intergenerational justice if it is
true that younger people tend to be more concerned with
the future [for a discussion, see 54]. Other institutional
conditions for the promotion of moral behavior include
the creation of an environment of physical and econom-
ic security, both internationally and locally, and the
reduction of the incidence of infectious disease [cf. 55].
We do not need to decide between these suggestions.
Our point is this: the idea of democracy has the theoret-
ical resources to engage with today’s mega-problems.
Rather than abandoning it in favor of more authoritarian
Pow(d)er to the People?
models—irrespective of whether they can be called
democracies—, the somewhat unfulfilled potential of
democracy has to be tapped: Equal influence of every-
one affected. Its realization surely requires no less than
drastic reforms. And one might well object that the same
moral myopia that prevents us from tackling climate
change and global injustice will likely prevent the im-
plementation of the principle of equal influence of ev-
eryone affected. But before we resort to harsh and
undemocratic means such as society-wide moral en-
hancement, we should take remaining democratic op-
tions seriously. Power –not powder–to the people.
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